This argument, as far as I know, is novel. It mirrors an argument for the existence of God in Richard Swinburne's The Existence of God, which argues for the existence of God from otherwise inexplicable brain and mental event correlations.
Consider the Special Composition Question: "What necessary and jointly sufficient conditions must any xs satisfy in order for it to be the case that there is an object composed of the xs?"[1]
Ned Markosian has argued that every answer yet suggested for answering this question has failed. He argues that we ought to take composition to be brute: "There is no true, non-trivial, and finitely long answer to SCQ." [2] Let's agree with Markosian that all previous answers to this question have failed and hold off on endorsing his answer to the question.
Suppose however, that none of the views above work, but it is still the case that the some xs are such that the xs compose some y but some zs are such that they do not compose some w. That is to say, some, but not all mereological simples compose something. There should be some fact of the matter about this too. In theory, we should be able to draw up a list of all of the composite objects and their simples with their properties. On brutalism, there is not going to be any explanation for why these simples with these properties compose something, rather than not. The set of correlated xs with their properties and composite ys will be brute, with no explanation.
Brute explanations are only epistemically permissible if there is no uneliminated explanation. [4] I submit that there is an uneliminated explanation. The correlation of xs with their properties and composite ys has a personal cause, a la Swinburne. [5] In fact, whether or not humans are composite physical objects, they will be unable to make it the case that these correlations are true. This is easy to see, there was a time before the first human. It is not plausible to think that the advent of humans started making trees out of xs shaped tree-wise. So, if there is a personal explanation, then it is not a human person. Furthermore, the personal cause must be a mereological simple himself otherwise, he would be insufficient to explain his own composition out of some xs. God fits this description and it is more plausible that the correlations of simples and their properties and the objects they compose are the result of the action of a divine personal cause than that they are brute.
So,
1. There are correlations between simples and composite objects.
2. If there are correlations of this sort, then said correlations are either explained or they are brute.
3. Said correlations are either explained or they are brute. (MP 1, 2)
4. If the correlations are explained, they are either explained by some form of Contact (and all strengthened forms, up to Fusion), Life-ism, Nihilism, Universalism or have a personal explanation.
5. It is false that they are explained by some form of Contact, Life-ism, Nihilism, or Universalism. (Not argued here, between van Inwagen and Markosian every one of these is dispatched). [6]
6. If the correlations are explained, they have a personal explanation.
7. Said correlations either are explained by a personal explanation or they are brute.
8. It is more probable that there is a personal explanation than that they are brute.
9. If there is a personal explanation, then there is a God. (see argument above).
10. It is more probable that there is a God than that the correlations are brute.
Even if this argument works, it has a modest conclusion. As with Swinburne's argument from mental/physical event correlations, it works best as part of a cumulative case.
I'm interested to hear what people think. I have my doubts about premises 5 and 8.
[1] Markosian, Ned, "Brutal Composition" Philosophical Studies 92: 211-249, 1998., 212
[2] Ibid., 214.
[3] Ibid., 223.
[4] I take it that this is plausible. However, I haven't the foggiest idea how to argue for it.
[5] Swinburne, Richard The Existence of God, 2nd Edition(Clarendon Press: Oxford), 2004, 35-51.
[6] van Inwagen, Peter, Material Beings, ( ), 1990.
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