Does the Denial of Maximal Justification Entail Infinitism?

Since I’ve been reading about infinitism lately, here’s an argument for infinitism. Infinitism is the theory of the structure of epistemic justification according to which a belief is justified if and only if there is an available infinite regress inferentially related justifying reasons. Peter Klein is the most famous proponent of the view, though there have been some new infinitists in the literature of late, including Jeremy Fantl, whose argument I’m concerned with here:

If for any degree of justification there is a higher degree of justification, then there will always be a reason such that, were you to have it, the degree of justification would increase. But this is just infinitism. [1]

Fantl here is arguing that you deny that there are any completely or maximally justified propositions, justified and incapable of having its justification increased, then you are committed to infinitism. I think this argument is subject to a counterexample. Fantl’s argument seems to be that if for any p justified for any S, there is always a higher degree of justification that p could have, then there is always another reason that could justify p further. Therefore there are an infinite number of reasons, which is infinitism. But here is why I think that this argument doesn’t work. Infinitism doesn’t only require that there be an infinite number of reasons, indeed, infinitism is completely consistent with skepticism, if infinitism is true and there are no propositions for which there are not infinite regresses of reasons justifying the antecedent reasons, then there is no knowledge. The key to infinitism is that there cannot only be an infinite collection of reasons, but that the reasons must themselves be inferentially justified. The denial of maximal justification is consistent with there being an infinite number of beliefs which are both noninferentially justified and inferentially justified. Thus, infinitism does not follow from the denial of maximal justification

[1] Fantl, Jeremy. "Modest Infinitism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44, no. 4 (2003): 537-562., 538.