Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Objective Values

In her article “Doing without objective values,” (Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker, eds., The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics, pp. 3-29.) Julia Annas states that in Sextus Empiricus’ arguments from the tenth Mode of Anesidemus, he is confusing moral realism with moral absolutism. Sextus proposes several arguments like the following: what is good by nature should be good for all, just as fire which is warm by nature warms all (PH III 179). But since different cultures have different beliefs about what is good, and are thus not similarly affected by what is good, we may conclude that nothing is good by nature. Hence, we should give up our beliefs about this or that object being good by nature and, suspending judgment, arrive at tranquility.

But, says Annas, this is a mistake since moral realism, which Sextus is trying to argue against, is not the same position as moral absolutism, which he actually argues against. Annas states that this confusion is one that “Sextus could reasonably have been expected to avoid,” (Annas 10) for three reasons. First, Sextus seems to argue that beliefs about what is good by nature are a source of anxiety, but that if we consider that goods are relative to persons or societies then we can suspend judgment on whether something is good by nature and achieve ataraxia. However, this supposition is unwarranted, since it could still be the case that a good relative to me is a real good, and this could presumably still be a cause of anxiety. Second, Annas produces Polystratus the Epicurean as an example of a philosopher who lived before Sextus and who made the distinction between moral realism and moral absolutism. And third, she points out that moral relativism is a far cry from skepticism, since the moral relativist will still have beliefs about what is good, even if it is relatively good.

I will grant here that Annas is correct in asserting that Sextus conflates the two positions, but I will offer responses to her arguments that this is a mistake that Sextus could and should have avoided. First, given Sextus’ overall project of producing ataraxia by whatever means necessary, it is unclear what advantage he would have gained in relation to his dogmatic opponents by distinguishing between moral realism and moral absolutism, given that most of his opponents would have held to both. Annas seems to be of the opinion that Sextus overlooked the possibility of his interlocutors’ taking refuge in the position that “this is really good, but only in relation to me” (Annas, 10). But while this is perhaps a possible move, it is, I think, highly improbable that Sextus’ opponents would have actually made such a move given their philosophical commitments, and thus Sextus is not to be blamed for not attempting to counter it.

And while Annas can point to one philosopher who made the distinction between moral realism and moral absolutism, this seems an insufficient objection unless it can be shown that this position was so widely held or influential as to warrant its own branch of skeptical arguments. No doubt Sextus, if confronted by a special individual case, could produce arguments suitable to his opponent’s particular dogmas; but in a work like PH, where he spends so little time on ethical issues, I believe it is sufficient for him to address the beliefs of the majority of his audience.

As to Annas’ third objection, it seems that she assumes that Sextus was arguing for a position (relativism) in order to get his opponents to accept the conclusion of his argument. If I am in fact reading her correctly, by way of reply I need only observe that Sextus did not advance relativistic arguments in order to get his opponents to be relativists, but in order to counterbalance their other ethical beliefs in an attempt to produce epoche and ataraxia. He is not committed to the position of relativism any more than he is committed to the position that fire is actually warm by nature. Thus, in light of Sextus' overall project I think that this particular criticism of Annas' is misguided.